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THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE: THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND 
RESPONSIBILITY, GENDER CRIMES IN ARMED CONFLICT, AND 
THE KAHAN REPORT (SABRA & SHATILLA)
Sherrie L. Russell-Brown*
Upon publication of his principles of war, Sun Tzu was summoned before a 
leading warrior king and asked to submit his theories to a test; Sun Tzu 
consented.  Two companies of women, untrained in military matters, were 
formed up and each placed under the command of one of the king’s 
favorite concubines.  They were armed and given cursory instruction in the 
then-current manual of arms and close order drill.  Then, to the sound of 
drums, Sun Tzu gave the order, “Right turn!”  The only response of the 
“companies” was one of laughter.  Sun Tzu remarked: “If the words of 
command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly 
understood, then the general is to blame.”  Again uttering the same 
command and receiving the same response, Sun Tzu then declared: “If the 
words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly 
understood, the general is to blame.  But if his orders are clear, and the 
soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.”  So 
saying and much to the consternation of the warrior king, Sun Tzu ordered 
the two company commanders beheaded and replaced by a member of 
each company.  The execution was viewed by all, the drum was again 
sounded for drill, and the companies thereafter executed all maneuvers 
with perfect accuracy and precision, never venturing to utter a sound.1
INTRODUCTION
The relevance and timeliness of an Article on the topic of 
preventing or deterring gender crimes in armed conflict is illustrated by the 
AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa and the world community’s focus 
on the crisis.  In January 2000, the United Nations Security Council held its 
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first meeting on the African AIDS pandemic.2  Dr. Peter Piot, Executive 
Director of UNAIDS and Under Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
acknowledged the connection between AIDS, armed conflict and gender 
crimes.3  Dr. Piot stated that, “[w]ar is the instrument of AIDS and rape is 
an instrument of war. Conflict and the resulting movements of people, 
whether armed combatants, or refugees, fuel the epidemic. In one study, 17 
percent of raped women, previously negative, became sero-positive. 
Refugee men and particularly women, become highly vulnerable to HIV 
infection. Indeed, another study showed that refugee women were six times 
more likely to become infected in camps than the outside population.”4  It 
is not surprising, therefore, that of the countries in Africa with the highest 
prevalence of HIV infection, half are engaged in conflict.5  And in those 
war torn countries, the rate of HIV infection among soldiers is 2 to 3 times 
higher than the rate in Africa’s civilian population.6  In some conflict 
zones, the rate rises to 50 times higher.7
The current AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa reflects an 
escalation of the consequences of wartime rape.  However, throughout 
history, although prohibited by the laws of war, gender crimes have 
occurred within internal and international armed conflicts and remain a 
continuing problem in international humanitarian law.8  For example, on 
2
 Aids Becoming Africa’s Top Human Security Issue, UN Warns, at
http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/press/eng/pressarc00/ny10100.html.
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 Statement of Dr. Peter Piot, Executive Director of UNAIDS, on the occasion of the 
Security Council meeting on HIV/AIDS in Africa, at
http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/speeches/eng/ny100100.html.
4 Id.
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 Protecting African Development and Security in the Age of Aids, at
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E5?OpenDocument.9999.
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 The Gender Aspects of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/hivaids/matlinspence.html.
7 Id. 
8
“During the Second World War, some 200,000 Korean women were forcibly held in 
sexual slavery to the Japanese army.  During the armed conflict in Bangladesh in 1971, it 
is estimated that 200,000 civilian women and girls were victims of rape committed by 
Pakistani soldiers. Mass rape of women has been used since the beginning of the conflict 
in the Former Yugoslavia.  Throughout the Somali conflict beginning in 1991, rival ethnic 
factions have used rape against rival ethnic factions.  During 1992 alone, 882 women were 
reportedly gang-raped by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir.  In Peru in 1982, 
rape of women by security forces was a common practice in the ongoing armed conflict 
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July 2, 2003, 650 Kenyan women who allege that they were sexually 
assaulted and in many cases gang-raped by British soldiers on military 
assignment in their country, won the right to sue the British Ministry of 
Defense for compensation.9  The lawyer for the women, Martyn Day, said 
that the rapes the women had recounted were not impulsive, but appeared 
to have been premeditated and planned by soldiers participating in annual 
exercises in remote parts of the East African country.10  Mr. Day said that 
the soldiers would “specifically ambush the women, they would pounce on 
them with a clear and coordinated understanding of what they were going 
to do.”11  Mr. Day said that he was “totally amazed and shocked” when he 
first heard the accounts of the rapes, but that he is now absolutely 
convinced the accounts are true.12  Apparently, there was not much of a 
sense among these soldiers that they would be held accountable for their 
conduct.  Where were the commanders when these soldiers were planning 
and executing 650 sexual assaults? Where was the sense of command 
responsibility?
The doctrine of command responsibility13 is an international 
humanitarian and military law doctrine, according to which military and 
between the Communist Party of Peru, the Shining Path, and government 
counterinsurgency forces.  In Myanmar, in 1992, government troops raped women in a 
Rohingya Muslim village after the men had been inducted into forced labor.  Under the 
former Haitian military regime of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, rape was used as a tool of 
political repression against female activists or female relatives of opposition members.” 
Human Rights Watch/Africa, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath n.39 (September 1996) [hereinafter, Shattered Lives]; 
Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 424, 425 (1993) (“Rape by soldiers has of course been prohibited by the law of 
war for centuries, and violators have been subjected to capital punishment under national 
military codes, such as those of Richard II (1385) and Henry V (1419).”). 
9 See Warren Hoge, Kenyan Women Accuse British Troops of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
2003, at A4.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13
 Some legal scholars refer to the doctrine as “superior responsibility” in order to capture 
the responsibility of civilian as well as military commanders.  See Sonia Boelaert-
Suominen, Prosecuting Superiors for Crimes Committed by Subordinates: A Discussion 
of the First Significant Case Law Since the Second World War, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 
750 (2000-2001) (“The term ‘superior’ properly encapsulates the categories of persons 
who may be accountable and the forms of control or authority over perpetrators that are 
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non-military “commanders” alike can be held criminally liable, if certain 
prerequisites are present, for the crimes committed by their “subordinates” 
as if the commanders had personally committed the crimes.14  A purpose of 
required.  In particular, as described in this article, the doctrine incorporates military 
commanders, paramilitary leaders, leaders of irregular structures and even civilian 
leaders.”).  Since I am primarily concerned with the criminal responsibility of military
commanders, I will refer to the doctrine as “command” not “superior” responsibility.
14 See Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 13, at 750  (“The theory of liability that allowed the 
Prosecution to rely on the imputed responsibility of these four accused is known as 
‘command’ or ‘superior’ responsibility.  It is a doctrine in international law whereby a 
person in authority may, under certain circumstances, be held criminally responsible for 
acts committed by subordinates because of a failure to prevent them from committing such 
acts or a failure to punish them after the acts have been committed.”); Lieutenant 
Commander Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the 
Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and 
Sabra, 107 MIL. L. REV. 71, 76 (1985) (“Command responsibility, by way of introduction, 
may be defined as the responsibility of military commanders for war crimes committed by 
subordinate members of their armed forces or other persons subject to their control.”); 
Ann B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici 
Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 167, 176 (1999) ([Command responsibility] “presents two sides of 
the coin – the commander’s responsibility for war crimes committed by a subordinate, and 
the plea of the subordinate that he or she was ‘acting in accordance with orders.’”); Mirjan 
Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (2001) 
(“‘Command responsibility’ is an umbrella term used in military and international law to 
cover a variety of ways in which individuals in positions of leadership may be held 
accountable.”); Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea 
for a Workable Standard, 97 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982) (“Although historically blurred, 
command criminal responsibility means specific criminal responsibility of the commander 
and not the general responsibility of command.”); W.J. Fenrick, Some International Law 
Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 103, 123-124 (1995-1996) (“The 
concept of command responsibility imposes personal criminal responsibility on a superior 
for international crimes committed by persons under his or her command or control.”); 
L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 320 (1995) (“The concept of command responsibility 
embraces two branches.  In the first place it concerns the responsibility of a commander 
who has given an order to an inferior to commit an act which is in breach of the law of 
armed conflict or whose conduct implies that he is not averse to such a breach being 
committed.  It also covers the plea of the inferior that he is not responsible for a breach 
because he was acting in accordance with orders or what he presumed to be the wishes of 
his commander, a plea that is more commonly described as that of ‘compliance with 
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the doctrine is the deterrence of violations of international humanitarian 
law.15  The doctrine of command responsibility is society’s “last line of 
superior orders.’”); Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of 
Command Responsibility, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2001) (“The doctrine of 
command responsibility imposes a duty on military commanders and civilian officials to 
ensure that subordinate troops adhere to the requirements of the law of war.”); Major 
Edward J. O’Brien, The Nuremberg Principles, Command Responsibility and the Defense 
of Captain Rockwood, 149 MIL. L. REV. 275, 286 (1995) (“Command responsibility is a 
legal doctrine whereby commanders, in some situations, may be held responsible for the 
unlawful conduct of their subordinates.”); Yuval Shany & Keren R. Michaeli, The Case 
Against Ariel Sharon: Revisiting the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, 34 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 797, 802-803 (2002) (“According to [the doctrine of command 
responsibility], a superior may be held criminally responsible under certain circumstances 
for crimes perpetrated by his or her subordinates if he or she failed to take adequate 
measures to prevent the commission of the crimes or to punish their perpetrators.”); Greg 
R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International 
Criminal Court, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 89, 92 (2000) (“One type of individual criminal 
culpability is the doctrine of command responsibility, ‘under which a commander incurs 
certain legal responsibility for the acts of his subordinates.’”); Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung 
(Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates – The Doctrine of 
Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J.
272 (1997) (The “customary international law doctrine of command responsibility may 
nevertheless hold superiors liable for their dereliction with respect to the duties that 
accompany their position.”).
15 See Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT. L.
573 (1999) (“In the bloody aftermath of World War I it became apparent that those in 
military or civilian authority provided a cornerstone for the good conduct of those under 
their command, and hence should carry some liability for their actions.”); Damaska, supra
note 14, at 471-475 (“The argument most frequently advanced in support of imputed 
command responsibility is the special deterrence needs of international criminal justice.”); 
Lippman, supra note 14, at 90-93 (“Command culpability is designed to encourage 
military commanders and civilian superiors to fulfill their legal duty to control the conduct 
of combatants.”); Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 803 (“Because the application of 
the doctrine [of command responsibility] leads to the imposition of vicarious liability upon 
commanders, it introduces a major incentive for commanders to exercise control over their 
troops and to suppress violation of the laws of war.”); Major Michael L. Smidt, 
Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military 
Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 165-167 (2000) (“If the purpose of the laws of war is 
to prevent unnecessary suffering, the commander is in the best position to prevent 
violations of these humanitarian goals . . . Commanders are ‘society’s last line of defense’ 
against war crimes.”); Vetter, supra note 14, at 92 (“Individual criminal responsibility, 
and command responsibility in particular, are important, because, to deter human rights 
6 [Vol. 
defense” against war crimes.16 Can the doctrine of command 
responsibility be used to deter or prevent the commission of gender crimes 
in armed conflict?  While scholars have addressed gender crimes in armed 
conflict and the doctrine of command responsibility as separate issues, they 
have ignored the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to
gender crimes in armed conflict.
I propose that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)17 use the 
doctrine of command responsibility to maximize the prevention of gender 
crimes in armed conflict.18  The language of the Rome Statute – the 
multilateral treaty that establishes the ICC – clearly authorizes the ICC to 
apply the doctrine of command responsibility to gender crimes in armed 
conflict.  
The Rome Statute limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to: 1) genocide; 2) 
crimes against humanity; 3) war crimes; and 4) the crime of aggression.19
In the Rome Statute, gender crimes can constitute acts of genocide, and are 
included as constitutive elements in the definitions of both crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.20  Specifically, Article 7 of the Rome Statute 
provides: 
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: . . . (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
abuses, potential perpetrators must perceive ICC prosecution as a possible consequence of 
their actions.”); Wu & Kang, supra note 14, at 290 (“From a regulatory standpoint, it is 
often a military or a civil leader who is the only, or at least best-situated, person to prevent 
the commission of atrocities – society’s last line of defense.”).  
16 See Smidt, supra note 15, at 167; Wu & Kang, supra note 14, at 290.
17
 The ICC entered into force on July 1, 2002, “the first day of the month after the 60th day 
following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” in accordance 
with Article 126(1) of the Rome Statute for the ICC (the “Rome Statute”).  See Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, July 17, 1998, 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), Article 126(1), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/.
18
 Throughout this Article, I will use the terms “armed conflict” and “war” interchangeably 
and international humanitarian law, the law of war and the law of armed conflict, 
interchangeably.
19 See the Rome Statute, supra note 17, Articles 5-8.
20 See Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l  L. 350 
(passim); the Rome Statute, supra note 17, Articles 7 and 8.
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prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.21
According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute: 
For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means: . . .[o]ther 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict [and in armed conflicts not of an 
international character], within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: . . 
.[c]ommitting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2(f), enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting 
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions [or constituting a 
serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions].22
The structure of the doctrine of command responsibility is set forth in 
Rome Statute Article 28, which provides that military and non-military 
leaders alike can be held responsible for crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, including gender crimes, committed by their subordinates.23
The three prerequisites to liability under the doctrine are: 1) a 
commander/subordinate relationship; 2) “knowledge” that subordinates are 
committing or about to commit the crimes; and 3) the failure to prevent or 
punish the crimes.
In this Article, I propose a conceptualization of Article 28 that 
should make it easier to impose on leaders criminal command 
responsibility for the commission of gender crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC.  It is my hope that this imposition of command responsibility 
will in turn lead to more effective prevention of such crimes.  The basic 
feature of my proposal is that the “knowledge” prerequisite for imposition 
of command responsibility under Article 28(a)(i) of the Rome Statute be 
satisfied with historical information, and common or public knowledge of 
the widespread occurrence of gender crimes in armed conflict.  Because, 
throughout history, gender crimes have occurred within internal and 
international armed conflicts, I propose that knowledge of their 
21 See the Rome Statute, supra note 17, at Article 7.
22 Id. at Article 8.
23 Id. at Article 28.
8 [Vol. 
commission should be assumed, and that the focus of any inquiry into 
imposition of command responsibility for gender crimes should shift to the 
third prerequisite of the doctrine, i.e. whether a military commander took 
all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress the commission of gender crimes or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.24
Although the intended result of my proposal is a shifting of the 
emphasis onto the “necessary and reasonable measures” taken by a 
commander, for a variety of reasons I will not address in this Article what 
those measures should be.  First, whether or not a military commander took 
“all necessary and reasonable measures” within his or her power to prevent 
or repress the commission of gender crimes or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution is a particularly 
case-specific analysis.  Second, I do not want to limit the range of 
measures that a military commander could take by listing examples or 
suggestions.  Further, I do not think that I, as someone with no military 
experience, am adequately equipped to make such suggestions.  Most 
importantly, however, it is not my belief that the widespread perpetration 
of gender crimes in armed conflict is a continuing problem due to a lack of 
clearly defined preventative or punitive measures.  For example, I do not 
believe that the British soldiers in Kenya possibly gang-raped women 
because the British military lacked clearly articulated methods of 
prevention, training or education.  It is my belief that the heart of the 
problem is not a lack of clearly defined “necessary and reasonable 
measures” but rather a lack of will or incentive on the part of military 
commanders to implement already articulated measures.  
There could be a number of reasons why military commanders are 
lax about or allow their subordinates to commit gender crimes.  It is 
possible that, in the chaos of war, while the commission of gender crimes 
by subordinates might be viewed as reprehensible, the prevention of these 
24
 I should note here that the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 and provides 
that no person shall be held criminally responsible under the Statute for conduct prior to 
that date.  See Rome Statute, supra note 17, at Article 24(1).  In addition, under Article 
126(2) of the Rome Statute, “[f]or each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding 
to [the Rome Statute, after July 1, 2002] the Statute shall enter into force on the first day 
of the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”  Id. at Article 126(2).  Thus, in evaluating 
Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i)’s knowledge prerequisite, I am concerned with the 
commission of gender crimes in armed conflicts as of July 1, 2002 and thereafter.
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crimes may not be a high priority.  Allowing the commission of gender 
crimes could also be viewed as a tactic of war, a way to demoralize, 
terrorize, and in the case of Bosnia and Rwanda, a way to destroy one’s 
enemy.  Notwithstanding the possible motivations, what is clear from the 
continued and historical perpetration of gender crimes in armed conflict is 
that there is a lack among military commanders of a sense of consequences 
or accountability for allowing their subordinates to commit gender crimes. 
 Going back to the Kenyan example, not only did the soldiers apparently 
lack a sense that justice might be brought to bear on their behavior, but 
apparently their commanders also lacked a sense that they, the 
commanders, might in turn suffer any grave consequences.  This lack of 
any sense of consequences or accountability may be attributable to the ease 
with which a commander could claim lack of knowledge that subordinates 
were committing or about to commit gender crimes.  This claim offends 
history and common knowledge as to the widespread perpetration of 
gender crimes in armed conflict.    
Under my proposal, by limiting a military commander’s ability to 
claim that he or she neither knew nor, owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known that his or her forces were committing or about to 
commit gender crimes, the prosecution of commanders is easier because 
only two prerequisites of the doctrine of command responsibility – a 
commander/subordinate relationship and a failure to prevent or punish –
remain to be satisfied.  By making it easier for military commanders to be 
held criminally liable for the gender crimes committed by their 
subordinates, my proposal provides the vital incentive and will for military 
commanders to implement preventative or punitive measures that in all 
likelihood are already in place.  In sum, this Article focuses on laying out 
the argument for allowing, exclusively with respect to gender crimes, the 
knowledge prerequisite of the doctrine of command responsibility under 
the Rome Statute to be satisfied with historical information, and common 
or public knowledge that gender crimes have been committed in internal 
and international armed conflicts, because it is through the satisfaction of 
the knowledge prerequisite that the incentive to prevent or deter is 
provided.
Precedent for my proposal can be found in a 1983 report25 – the 
Kahan Report – issued by the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the 
25 See The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Final 
Report (1983) (Authorized Translation), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 473 (1983) [the “Kahan 
Report”].
10 [Vol. 
Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut.  In the Kahan Report, the 
Commission held the State of Israel and several individuals, including 
military commanders, “indirectly” responsible for a massacre committed 
by a Lebanese armed force in September 1982 at two largely Palestinian 
refugee camps – the Sabra and Shatilla camps – in Beirut, Lebanon.26
With respect to the “indirect responsibility” of certain military
commanders, the Commission imposed responsibility, in part, because 
violence by the Lebanese armed force against the Palestinians had 
historically occurred in the past; based on that historical information, the 
Commission found that the military commanders should have known that 
there was a risk of future violence by the Lebanese armed force against the 
Palestinians, and should have taken measures to guard against such 
violence.27
In Part I, I discuss the Rome Statute, the doctrine of command 
responsibility and the knowledge prerequisite of the doctrine under Rome 
Statute Article 28(a)(i).  Part II addresses the Kahan Report and its use of 
historical information and common or public knowledge.  In Part III, I 
examine the application of the standard adopted under the Kahan Report to 
Article 28(a)(i) of the Rome Statute, specifically with respect to gender 
crimes.  I conclude that the application to Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i) of 
the standard adopted by the Kahan Report should increase the likelihood of 
prosecution and conviction for gender crimes committed in armed conflict, 
which likelihood should increase the incentive to prevent the commission 
of gender crimes in armed conflict.
26 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25 (passim); Linda A. Malone, The Kahan Report, 
Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under 
International Law for Massacres of Civilian Population, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 373, 374 
(1985); Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 808, 813-816.
27 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 496-499, 502-503, 505-507; Shany & Michaeli, 
supra note 14, at 813-816.
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I.  THE ROME STATUTE, THE  DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND THE KNOWLEDGE PREREQUISITE OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND 
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 28(A)(I) OF THE ROME STATUTE   
According to Colonel William G. Eckhardt: 
• the very heart of military professionalism is command 
responsibility;28
• productive dialogue between commanders and lawyers is 
stressed, and the need for reordering our training regarding 
professional conduct on the battlefield is recognized;29
• the humanitarian and the soldier must “get in step;”30
• a properly articulated and understood standard of command 
responsibility allows the teaching and preventive functions 
of the law to be appropriately exercised;31
• an agreed-upon standard of command responsibility is the 
cornerstone for the application of reasoned moral judgment 
and the rule of law on the battlefield;32
• through the friction and fog of war, it is primarily the 
authority of the commander that gets things done;33
• states, soldiers and citizens trust their “all” to the 
commander;34
• knowledge is and will continue to be the primary issue in 
cases involving command responsibility;35 and
28 See Eckardt, supra note 14, at 8.
29 Id. at 2.
30 Id. 
31 Id.
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 18.
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• the knowledge expected of an officer or of a 
noncommissioned officer must be precisely defined.36
I hope to advance the above themes by working towards 
articulating an expressed, acceptable, workable and practical standard of 
command responsibility.  My evaluation of and attempt at “precisely” 
defining the knowledge prerequisite of the doctrine of command 
responsibility is where I begin.
A.  The Rome Statute and the Doctrine of Command Responsibility 
Under Article 28 of the Rome Statute:  
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this 
Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: 
a. A military commander or person effectively acting as a 
military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his 
or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew, or 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known 
that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power 
to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution. 
b. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships 
not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and 
control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates, where: 
36 Id. at 21.
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(i) The superior knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates 
were committing or about to commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the 
effective responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution.37
This regime is referred to as the doctrine of “command responsibility.”
As explained above, the normative appeal of using the doctrine of 
command responsibility to maximize the prevention of gender crimes is 
based upon a purpose of the doctrine – the deterrence of violations of 
international humanitarian law.38  Command responsibility is society’s 
“last line of defense.”39  The modality and hierarchical nature of the 
military illustrate its preventative capacity:  
It is to the leader that a young soldier looks for guidance in terms of 
distinguishing appropriate and inappropriate uses of force during 
military operations . . . In combat, where soldiers are routinely 
asked to participate in conduct that under normal conditions would 
be labeled as immoral or unlawful, often the leader becomes the 
soldier’s surrogate conscience.  Soldiers learn to rely on the 
commander’s guidance as the soldier surrenders some of his own 
discretion, judgment, and inhibitions to play a role in the collective 
success of the unit and to further the higher cause in which they are 
engaged.  The soldier learns, to a degree, to subordinate his 
instincts for survival and ideas of right and wrong to his leader’s 
orders.  The soldier has a general obligation to obey a superior’s 
orders and to presume that the orders received from the superior are 
lawful . . . The military, [therefore], is a unique society where the 
commander has tremendous authority over subordinates not 
normally extended to superiors in the civilian sector.  Coupled with 
this significant lawful control over the troops is the commander’s 
stewardship over a unit’s tremendously awesome destructive 
37 Id.
38 See supra note 15.  
39 See supra note 16.
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capabilities.  Mankind must, therefore, rely on commanders to use 
their authority to control both a military force’s organic capacity 
for destruction and the conduct of their subordinates.
Commanders have both a moral and legal role in preventing 
atrocities that could potentially be committed by subordinates 
against non-combatants, including the wounded and sick, civilians, 
and prisoners of war, as well as the destruction of civilian property 
lacking in military value.40
I will digress here very briefly to discuss the agreements and 
disagreements among international law scholars about some aspects of the 
doctrine of command responsibility.  Upon realizing that in any two pieces 
of scholarship on the doctrine, I could read two completely opposite 
interpretations of the same factual, historical material, I decided to 
examine, catalog and organize the issues on which scholars agreed and 
disagreed.  Because it was a lengthy propaedeutic to sift through the 
confusion, I think that it might be beneficial and might advance the 
scholarship on the doctrine of command responsibility to present a 
distillation of the areas of agreement and disagreement about the doctrine.  
By doing so, I am attempting to pinpoint and clarify the remaining open 
questions that might need to be addressed either by the ICC or in future 
scholarship.  
The main disagreement among international law scholars about the 
doctrine of command responsibility is over the knowledge prerequisite and 
what the currently recognized standard is for satisfying that prerequisite 
under customary international law.  Scholars also disagree about the 
appropriate analogous characterization of the doctrine in United States 
statute or common law terms.  
With respect to the currently recognized standard for satisfying the 
knowledge prerequisite, there are two competing standards.  Under the 
“should have known” standard, also known as a “simple negligence” 
standard, the standard is whether the commander failed to acquire
information that would have alerted the commander about the possible 
commission of crimes by his or her subordinates.  Under a stricter 
standard, the standard is whether a commander who was in possession of 
information failed to conclude that his or her subordinates were going to 
commit crimes.    
40 See Smidt, supra note 15, at 158 and 166 [emphasis added].
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Some international law scholars contend that the post-World War II 
treaties and the statutes for the modern international criminal tribunals, in 
which command responsibility is addressed, all rely on a “should have 
known” standard and that, therefore, that standard, is the currently 
recognized standard to satisfy the knowledge prerequisite for imposition of 
command responsibility.41  Other international law scholars contend that 
the currently recognized standard, as espoused in the post-World War II 
treaties and the statutes for the modern international criminal tribunals, is 
the stricter standard requiring possession of some information.42  With 
respect to the issue of the appropriate analogous characterization of the 
doctrine in United States statute or common law terms, scholars disagree 
about whether the doctrine is different from or a type of accomplice 
liability43, and whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be 
characterized as one of imputed responsibility, vicarious liability, both or 
neither.44
41 See e.g., id. at 200-201 (“The Yamashita ‘knew or should have known’ standard for 
command responsibility is the one currently recognized by the international community, as 
customary international law.  In addition to Yamashita and the other post-World War II 
international tribunal decisions, post-World War II treaties and the statutes for the modern 
international criminal tribunals all rely on Yamashita.”). 
42 See e.g., Major Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command 
Responsibility Then and Now, 149 MIL. L. REV. 293, 299-300 (1995) (“Although the 
United States has not ratified Protocol I, the delegates’ rejection of the ‘should have 
known’ standard proposed by the United States signals that the Yamashita precedent may 
not carry any weight in the international community . . . Even in United States courts, 
Yamashita has lost favor.  If it ever stood for a strict liability standard, that strict standard 
never has been enforced again.  The Protocol I standard is probably the best indication of 
what the international community would find acceptable, and that standard rejects any 
strict liability.  Comparing the Protocol I standard with that established by the United 
Nations Security Council in creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, the two appear to be quite similar.”).
43 See Vetter, supra note 14, at 98 (“Command responsibility is different in origin and 
formulation from accomplice liability.”); Wu & Kang, supra note 14, at 284 (“Command 
responsibility is in some ways a kind of accomplice liability, and the existing international 
law of command responsibility seems to support a mens rea requirement analogous to the 
‘knowing facilitation’ rule of United States accomplice liability.”).
44 See Bantekas, supra note 15, at 577 (“It is obvious, thus, that the doctrine of command 
responsibility refers to ‘imputed liability’ and not, as erroneously state in the Celebici
judgment, to ‘vicarious liability.’”); Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 5 (“Nor does [command 
responsibility ] mean imputed criminal responsibility which has been so publically and 
emotionally misargued by persons with impressive credentials.  Command criminal 
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I make no attempt to settle the disagreements over what the current 
standard is for satisfaction of the knowledge prerequisite under the doctrine 
of command responsibility.  As discussed in further detail below, whether 
the ICC interprets Rome Statute Article 28 as incorporating a “should have 
known”/“simple negligence” or stricter/“some information” standard, the 
use of historical information, and common or public knowledge to satisfy 
the knowledge prerequisite renders the debate over the standard moot.45
As for the areas of agreement among international law scholars, 
with respect to the origin of the doctrine of command responsibility, 
international law scholars agree that the theoretical underpinnings of the 
doctrine and the notion of general responsibility of commanders have 
existed for centuries46, and that the first international recognition of the 
command responsibility doctrine occurred with the Hague Convention IV 
1907.47  Scholars also agree that it was not until the end of World War I 
responsibility for actions of subordinates requires personal involvement, connection, 
knowledge, or intent . . . Vicarious punishment is repulsive to a civilized society.”); Shany 
& Michaeli, supra note 14, at 804 (“Hence, the doctrine should be narrowly construed so 
as to conform to its underlying rationales, which justify the imposition of vicarious 
liability . . ..”); Vetter, supra note 14, at 99 (“Imputed command responsibility under the 
ICC is described in article 28, and is a form of vicarious criminal liability because the 
liability arises from the relationship between the superior and the subordinate, and not 
from the commander or superior’s direct action to communicate orders initiating the 
unlawful behavior.”); Wu & Kang, supra note 14, at 282 (“The critical issue here arises 
from the fact that the liability of the superior is derivative in some sense, even though it is 
not and should not be ‘imputed’ or ‘vicarious.’”).
45 See infra Part III.
46 See Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 13, at 754-755 (“the concept of superior 
responsibility was recognized early on in international criminal law”); Burnett, supra note 
14, at 77 (Hagenbach, 1474); Ching, supra note 14, at 176 (Sun Tzu, 500 B.C.); 
Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The Chances 
for Successful Prosecution, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 193 (1994) (190 B.C.); Green, supra
note 14, at 321 (Charles VII of France, 1439); Howard S. Levie, Command Responsibility, 
8 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997-1998) (Grotius, 1625); Parks, supra note 1, at 
1, 3 and 19 (Sun Tzu, 500 B.C.); Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 816 (Grotius, 
1625); Smidt, supra note 15, at 169-170 (Hagenbach, 1474).
47 See Bantekas, supra note 15, at 573 (“The Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) 
establishing the doctrine of ‘command responsibility.’”); Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 
13, at 755 (“It is often suggested that the roots of the modern doctrine of command 
responsibility may be found in the Hague Convention of 1907.”); Burnett, supra note 14, 
at 131 (“A general description of the military commander’s role in hostilities first surfaced 
in the Fourth and Tenth Hague Conventions of 1907.”); Ching, supra note 14, at 177 
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that the concept of individual criminal responsibility for the failure to take 
the necessary measures to prevent or to repress crimes was given explicit 
expression in an international context48, and that it was the war crimes 
trials after World War II that gave international application to and 
consummated the doctrine of command responsibility.49  Further, scholars 
(“Perhaps the first international recognition of the command responsibility doctrine 
occurred in the Hague Convention IV of 1907.”); Fenrick, supra note 14, at 112 (“The 
roots of the customary law doctrine of military command responsibility can be found in 
Hague Convention IV of 1907 and in decisions of certain war crimes tribunals following 
World War II.”); Green, supra  note 14, at 325 (“The first treaty obligation making a 
superior liable for breaches of humanitarian law committed during war is to be found in 
Article 3 of the IV Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land.”); Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 817 (“The first international legal 
instrument that implicitly recognized the doctrine of command responsibility was the 1907 
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War.”); Smidt, supra note 15, at 
171 (“The first attempt to codify the customary concept of command responsibility in 
international law appears in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.”).
48 See Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 13, at 755 (“It was not until the end of World War I, 
however, that the notion of individual criminal responsibility for failure to take necessary 
measures to prevent or to repress breaches of the laws of armed conflict was given explicit 
expression in an international context.”); Burnett, supra note 14, at 131 (“By the end of 
World War I, however, the concept of [command responsibility] was becoming 
increasingly criminal in its normative content in the international community . . ..”); 
Lippman, supra note 14, at 9 (“The issue of command responsibility arose during the 
debate over the prosecution of war crimes committed during World War I.”); Shany & 
Michaeli, supra note 14, at 817 (“The earliest attempt to prosecute commanders for crimes 
perpetrated by troops subject to their authority was made in the aftermath of World War 
I.”).
49 See Bantekas, supra note 15, at 573 (“Subsequent proceedings after World War II have 
provided ample legal precedent in support of the doctrine of command responsibility and 
have elaborated on its content.”); Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 13, at 756 (“It was only 
in the aftermath of World War II that the doctrine of command responsibility for failure to 
act received its first judicial recognition in an international context.”); O’Brien, supra note 
14, at 285 (“The post-World War II Tribunals consummated the doctrine of command 
responsibility and the duty to control one’s soldiers.”); Parks, supra note 1, at 76-77 (“The 
trials upon the conclusion of World War II gave international application on a major scale 
to a custom first given substantial recognition by its codification in Hague Convention IV 
of 1907.”); Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 816 (The “first instance in which the 
doctrine of command responsibility was systematically developed and applied was at the 
end of World War II in the context of the trials of Nazi and Japanese war criminals.”); 
Smidt, supra note 15, at 176 (“It was during the [WWII] war crimes trials themselves that 
the doctrine of command responsibility developed.”); Wu & Kang, supra note 14, at 274 
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agree that the 1977 Protocol I is the first international treaty to explicitly 
address the doctrine of command responsibility.50  According to Article 
86(2) of Protocol I, responsibility can be imposed on a commander if the 
commander “knew, or had information which should have enabled [the 
commander] to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that [a 
subordinate] was committing or was going to commit” a breach of the 
Geneva Conventions or of the Protocol itself, and “did not take all feasible 
measures within [the commander’s] power to prevent or repress the 
breach.”51
Returning to the main point of this Article, as there are 
disagreements about some aspects of the doctrine of command 
responsibility, there are also different interpretations as to the scope of the 
doctrine.52  According to some interpretations of the doctrine, it 
encompasses both the direct responsibility of a commander who has given 
a subordinate an order to commit an act in breach of the law of armed 
conflict, and the indirect responsibility of a commander for acts committed 
by a subordinate because of a failure to prevent the subordinate from 
committing the act or a failure to punish the subordinate after the act had 
been committed.53  In this Article, I am concerned with the latter type of 
(“The modern doctrine of command responsibility is one of the products of the 
developments in the law of armed conflict associated with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
at the end of World War II.”).
50 See Crowe, supra note 46, at 224 (“In 1977, a field of international delegates amended 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, for the first time, specifically 
addressed the doctrine of command responsibility.”); Fenrick, supra note 14, at 118 (“The 
first treaty to explicitly address the doctrine of command responsibility is the Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 . . ..”); Smidt, supra note 15, at 201-202 (“The first international 
attempt to codify command responsibility appears in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I).”); Wu & Kang, supra note 14, at 276 (“The first 
international treaty to codify the doctrine of command responsibility is Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”).
51
 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 
1977, 16 Int’l Legal Materials 1442 (1977), [hereinafter, “Protocol I”], Article 86(2).
52 See supra note 14. 
53 See Ching, supra note 14, at 176 (“Furthermore, the commander’s responsibility is 
twofold: commanders may be directly liable for issuing illegal orders and may also be 
liable for the unlawful acts subordinates, if the commanders knew or should have known 
about the illegal acts, but failed to prevent or punish them.”). 
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indirect responsibility, based upon a commander’s failure to properly 
discharge his or her duties to prevent or punish.
Specifically, because my analysis is based on Article 28(a) of the 
Rome Statute, I define command responsibility as the criminal 
responsibility of a “military commander or person effectively acting as a 
military commander . . . for crimes within the jurisdiction of the [ICC] 
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or 
effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such forces.”54  Also, the term 
“commander” means, in accordance with Article 28(a), a “military 
commander or person effectively acting as a military commander”55 and 
“subordinate” means someone under a commander’s “effective command 
and control, or effective authority and control as the case my be.”56  Thus, 
command responsibility means the personal, individual criminal liability of 
a commander, under certain circumstances, for the crimes committed by 
his or her subordinates. 
In its indirect form – based on the failure to act as opposed to direct 
action such as the issuance of illegal orders – some variants of the doctrine 
of command responsibility may not be consistent with the culpability-
restricting principles of municipal law.57  Professor Mirjan Damaska 
argues that both the failure to prevent and the failure to punish comprise 
two variants.58  The first variant of the failure to prevent includes situations 
in which a commander “knows” that his or her subordinate is about to 
commit a crime, but fails to take appropriate measures to prevent the 
commission of the crime.59  The first variant of the failure to punish
includes situations in which a commander’s failure to punish contributes to 
further criminal activity of those under his or her command.60  In these 
situations, Damaska contends, the commander’s conduct arguably shades 
into accomplice liability.61  The second variants of the failure to prevent or 
to punish include, respectively, situations in which the commanders 
negligently failed to obtain information capable of putting them in a 
54 See the Rome Statute, supra note 17, Article 28(a).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Damaska, supra note 14, passim.
58 Id. at 461 and 467.
59 Id. at 461.
60 Id. at 467.
61 Id. at 462 and 467.
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position to prevent their subordinates’ criminal activity or commanders 
failed to call their subordinates to task after the commanders had learned 
about what their subordinates had done.62  Professor Damaska argues that 
in the second variants of a commander’s failure to prevent or punish, the 
commander’s liability is divorced from his or her culpability to such a 
degree that conviction no longer mirrors his or her underlying conduct and 
actual mens rea.63
Similarly, in its indirect form, the second variants of the doctrine of 
command responsibility (as well as the notion of using criminal 
punishment to promote the deterrence of future crimes) run counter to the 
classical Kantian view of a retributive or “just deserts” theory of justice, 
which holds that punishment should be proportionate to the level of moral 
iniquity.64  Criminal punishment can be justified on two grounds: 
utilitarian and retributivist.65  For utilitarians, criminal punishment is 
justified by the future benefit it provides, namely a reduction in future 
crimes.66  Jeremy Bentham argued that “[g]eneral prevention ought to be 
the chief end of punishment, as it is its real justification.”67  To Bentham 
“an offender’s punishment ought to be set not according to the amount 
deserved, but rather according to the amount needed to deter future 
instances of the offense.”68  In contrast, according to those who subscribe 
to the “retributivist” or “just deserts” view, to give an offender “what he or 
she deserves for a past crime is a valuable end in itself and needs no further 
justification.”69  Kant argued that:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to 
promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil 
society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on 
62 Id. at 462-464 and 468.
63 Id. at 464 and 468.
64
 Immanuel Kant, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (1999 ed.); see also 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454-
455 (1997) (summarizing Immanuel Kant’s theory of “just deserts” which held that 
punishment should be proportionate to “their internal wickedness”).
65 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 64, at 454.
66 Id.
67 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
396 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
68 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 64, at 455.
69 Id. at 454.
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the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can 
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of 
someone else and can never be included among objects of the Law 
of things [Sachenrecht].  His innate Personality [that is, his right as 
a Person] protects him against such treatment, even though he may 
indeed be condemned to forfeit his civil Personality.  He must first 
be found to be deserving of punishment before any consideration is 
given to the utility of this punishment for himself or for his fellow 
citizens.70
The utilitarian and retributivist views are generally considered 
irreconcilable although there have been recent attempts to “reconcile” 
them.71
The second variants of the doctrine of command responsibility run 
counter to the retributivist view of criminal punishment because under 
those two variants, criminal punishment can be imposed upon a 
commander notwithstanding the absence of a culpable state of mind.  
Arguably, under the second variants of the indirect form of doctrine of 
command responsibility, the commander is getting more than his or her 
“just deserts” for the benefit of a future reduction in war crimes.  
Professor Jeffrie Murphy questioned whether Kant has a theory of 
punishment and whether it is proper to continue to think of Kant as a 
paradigm retributivist in the theory of punishment.72  Based on an analysis 
of Kant’s writings other than the Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 
Murphy proposed the following “reasonably consistent [Kantian] 
philosophical account of state punishment:”  “[t]he role of criminal 
punishment . . . is instrumental . . . justified solely by reference to the end 
of maintaining a peaceful system of ordered liberty.  It will accomplish this 
end primarily through deterrence.”73  I prefer Murphy’s interpretation of 
Kant’s theory of criminal punishment.  In addition, because of the 
continuing violations of women’s human rights during war and the 
implications of those violations (including the transmission of HIV), the 
adoption of a utilitarian or Benthamian view of criminal punishment with 
respect to command responsibility and gender crimes is justified.  
70 See Kant, supra note 64, at 138.
71 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 64, passim.
72 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 
509 (1987).
73 Id. at 512-516.
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B.  The Knowledge Prerequisite of the Doctrine of Command 
Responsibility Under Article 28(a)(i) of the Rome Statute
The doctrine of command responsibility under Rome Statute 
Article 28(a) can be divided into three prerequisites: 1) status, 2) 
knowledge, and 3) failure to take action.  Specifically, in order to impose 
criminal responsibility under Article 28(a), at the time of the commission 
of the crime(s): 1) the defendant had to have the status of “commander” 
and the person or persons committing the crime(s) had to have the status of 
“subordinate(s)”;74 2) the commander/defendant had either to know, or 
“owing to circumstances at the time, should have known” that the 
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;75 and 3) the 
commander/defendant had to have failed to take “all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress” the 
subordinate’s crimes, “or to submit the matter to the competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution.”76
I confine myself in this Article to the second prerequisite of 
command responsibility namely, the knowledge prerequisite.  The 
fundamental question is then what, under Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i), is 
the meaning of the phrase “owing to the circumstances at the time, should 
have known.”   
74 See the Rome Statute, supra note 17, at Article 28(a).
75 Id. at Article 28(a)(i).
76 Id. at Article 28(a)(ii).
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II. THE KAHAN REPORT, HISTORICAL INFORMATION, AND COMMON OR 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
Putting aside cases in which there is evidence of actual knowledge 
that forces were committing or about to commit gender crimes, I propose 
only with respect to gender crimes that historical information, and common 
or public knowledge that gender crimes have occurred throughout history 
within internal and international armed conflicts, should be deemed to 
satisfy the “owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known” 
prerequisite for imposition of liability under Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i). 
 In short, because the perpetration of gender crimes in armed conflict and 
the knowledge of the perpetration are pervasive and widespread, I propose 
that, solely with respect to gender crimes, knowledge should be assumed.  
The Kahan Report provides precedent for this proposal.  
On September 16, 1982, Israeli Defense Forces (I.D.F.) – in West 
Beirut as a result of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982 –
permitted the Phalangists, a Lebanese Christian armed force, to enter the 
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps.77  From 6:00 p.m. on September 16th
until 8:00 a.m. on September 18th, the Phalangists tortured, raped, 
kidnapped and massacred men, women, and children, mostly Palestinians 
and Lebanese, but also including Iranians, Syrians, Pakistanis and 
Algerians.78  Because some of the people killed were taken away in trucks 
or buried in mass graves, an exact number of casualties could not be 
ascertained.79  However, estimates of those killed range from 300 to 3,000 
people.80
77 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 477, 480 and 481; Burnett, supra note 14, at 
152 and 155; Linda A. Malone, The Appointment of General Yaron: Continuing Impunity 
for the Sabra and Shatilla Massacres, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287, 288 and 290 (2000); 
Malone, The Kahan Report, supra note 26, at 374; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 
808 and 810.
78 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 482-493; Burnett, supra note 14, at 156-159; 
Malone, The Appointment of General Yaron, supra note 77, at 291-300; Malone, The 
Kahan Report, supra note 26, at 374; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at  797 and 810-
813.
79 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 491; Burnett, supra note 14, at 159; Malone, 
The Appointment of General Yaron, supra note 77, at 300-301; Malone, The Kahan 
Report, supra note 26, at 374; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at  797 and 810-813.
80 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 491; Burnett, supra note 14, at 159; Malone, 
The Appointment of General Yaron, supra note 77, at 300-301; Malone, The Kahan 
Report, supra note 26, at 374; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at  797 and 810-813.
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On September 28, 1982, the Government of Israel decided to 
establish the Commission charged with investigating the “Sabra and 
Shatilla” massacre.81  The Commission was comprised of then President of 
the Israeli Supreme Court, Yitzhak Kahan, then Justice Aharon Barak, and 
Major General in reserve Yona Efrat.82  On February 7, 1983, the 
Commission published its Kahan Report, in which it found the State of 
Israel and several individuals “indirectly” responsible for the massacre.83
Specifically, the Commission found then Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon 
and Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan indirectly responsible for the massacre 
committed by the Phalangists.  The Commission found that Sharon and 
Eitan had knowledge that violence by the Phalangists against the 
Palestinians had historically occurred in the past, and based on that 
historical information Sharon and Eitan should have known that there was 
a risk of future violence by the Phalangists against the Palestinians and, 
consequently, should have taken measures to guard against such violence.84
The Commission began its analysis of the indirect responsibility of 
the State of Israel for the atrocities committed at Sabra and Shatilla by 
examining “whether persons acting and thinking rationally were 
dutybound, when the decision was taken to have the Phalangists enter the 
camps, to foresee, according to the information that each of them 
possessed and according to public knowledge, that the entry of the 
Phalangists into the camps held out the danger of a massacre and that no 
little probability existed that it would in fact occur.”85  In articulating its 
analysis, the Commission explained that, in its view:
[E]everyone who had anything to do with events in Lebanon should 
have felt apprehension about a massacre in the camps, if armed 
Phalangist forces were to be moved into them without the I.D.F. 
exercising concrete and effective supervision and scrutiny of them. 
All those concerned were well aware that combat morality among 
81 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 473; Burnett, supra note 14, at 75-76; Malone, 
The Appointment of General Yaron, supra note 77, at 287; Malone, The Kahan Report, 
supra note 26, at 374; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 806. 
82 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 473; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 806.
83 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25 (passim); Malone, The Kahan Report, supra note 
26, at 374; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 806, 813-816.
84 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 496-499, 502-503, 505-507; Shany & Michaeli, 
supra note 14, at 813-816.
85 See the Kahan Report, supra note 25, at 497-498 [emphasis added].
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the various combatant groups in Lebanon differs from the norm in 
the I.D.F., that the combatants in Lebanon belittle the value of 
human life far beyond what is necessary and accepted in wars 
between civilized peoples, and that various atrocities against the 
noncombatant population had been widespread in Lebanon since 
1975.  It was well known that the Phalangists harbor deep enmity 
for the Palestinians, viewing them as the source of all the troubles 
that afflicted Lebanon during the years of the civil war.  The fact 
that in certain operations carried out under close I.D.F. supervision 
the Phalangists did not deviate from disciplined behavior could not 
serve as an indication that their attitude toward the Palestinian 
population had changed, or that changes had been effected in their
plans – which they made no effort to hide – for the Palestinians.86
The Commission also mentioned that there were news articles in the press 
stating that “excesses could be expected on the part of the Christian 
fighters.”87
Further, the Commission clarified that it was not saying that “the 
decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps should under no 
circumstances have been made and was totally unwarranted.”88  The 
Commission explained that:
[H]ad the decision-makers and executors been aware of the 
danger of harm to the civilian population on the part of the 
Phalangists but had nevertheless, having considered all the 
circumstances, decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps 
while taking all possible steps to prevent harm coming to the 
civilian population, it is possible that there would be no place to be 
critical of them, even if ultimately it had emerged that the decision 
had caused undesirable results and had caused damage.89
On the issue of the indirect responsibility of Ariel Sharon, then
Minister of Defense, Sharon’s position was that “no one had imagined the 
86 Id. at 498 [emphasis added].
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 498-499 [emphasis added].
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Phalangists would carry out a massacre in the camps and that it was a 
tragedy that could not be foreseen.”90  Sharon stressed that:
[T]he director of Military Intelligence, who spent time with him 
and maintained contact with him on the days prior to the 
Phalangists’ entry into the camps and at the time of [I.D.F.’s] entry 
into the camps, did not indicate the danger of a massacre, and that 
no warning was received from the Mossad [the Israeli intelligence 
agency], which was responsible for the liaison with the Phalangists 
and also had special knowledge of the character of this force.91
In response to Sharon’s position, congruent with the views it expressed 
about the indirect responsibility of the State of Israel, the Commission held 
that:
[I]n our view, even without such warning, it is impossible to justify 
the Minister of Defense’s disregard of the danger of a massacre.  
We will not repeat here what we have already said above about the 
widespread knowledge regarding the Phalangists’ combat ethics, 
their feelings of hatred toward the Palestinians, and their leaders’ 
plans for the future of the Palestinians when said leaders would 
assume power.  Besides this general knowledge, the Defense 
Minister also had special reports from his not inconsiderable 
[number of] meetings with the Phalangist heads before Bashir’s 
assassination.92
Finally, the Commission held that: 
If in fact the Defense Minister, when he decided that the 
Phalangists would enter the camps without the IDF taking part in 
the operation, did not think that that decision could bring about the 
very disaster that in fact occurred, the only possible explanation for 
this is that he disregarded any apprehensions about what was to be 
expected because the advantages – which we have already noted –
90 Id. at 502.
91 Id.
92 Id. [emphasis added].
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to be gained from the Phalangists’ entry into the camps distracted 
him from the proper consideration in this instance.93
On the issue of the indirect responsibility of the I.D.F. Chief of 
Staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, Eitan, like Sharon, took the 
position that: 
[I]t had never occurred to him that the Phalangists would perpetrate 
acts of revenge and bloodshed in the camps.  He justified this lack 
of foresight by citing the experience of the past, whereby massacres 
were perpetrated by the Christians only before the Peace of Galilee 
War and only in response to the perpetration of a massacre by the 
Muslims against the Christian population, and by citing the 
disciplined conduct of the Phalangists while carrying out certain 
operations after the IDF’s entry into Lebanon.94
Again, congruent with its views of Sharon’s and the State of Israel’s 
indirect responsibility, the Commission held that:
We are not prepared to accept these explanations.  In our view, 
none of these reasons had the power to cancel out the serious 
concern that in going into the refugee camps, the Phalangist forces 
would perpetrate indiscriminate acts of killing.  We rejected 
arguments of this kind in the part of this report that deals with 
indirect responsibility, as well as in our discussion of the 
responsibility borne by the Minister of Defense, and the reasons we 
presented there likewise hold for the Chief of Staff’s position. . . . 
Past experience in no way justified the conclusion that the entry of 
the Phalangists into the camps posed no danger.  The Chief of Staff 
was well aware that the Phalangists were full of feelings of hatred 
towards the Palestinians and that their feelings had not changed 
since the “Peace for Galilee” War. . . . [t]he absence of a warning 
from experts cannot serve as an explanation for ignoring the danger 
of a massacre.  The Chief of Staff should have known and foreseen 
– by virtue of common knowledge, as well as the special 
information at his disposal – that there was a possibility of harm to 
the population in the camps at the hands of the Phalangists.  Even 
93 Id. [emphasis added].
94 Id. at 505.
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if the experts did not fulfill their obligation, this does not absolve 
the Chief of Staff of responsibility.95
As the Commission had stated with respect to Minister Sharon, it held that:
If the Chief of Staff did not imagine at all that the entry of the 
Phalangists into the camps posed a danger to the civilian 
population, his thinking on this matter constitutes a disregard of 
important considerations that he should have taken into account.  
Moreover, considering the Chief of Staff’s own statements quoted 
above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Chief of Staff 
ignored this danger out of an awareness that there were great 
advantages to sending the Phalangists into the camps, and perhaps 
also out of a hope that in the final analysis, the Phalangists 
excesses would not be on a large scale.  This conclusion is likewise 
prompted by the Chief of Staff’s behavior during later stages, once 
reports began to come in about the Phalangists’ excesses in the 
camp.96
In sum, in the Kahan Report, the Commission found Sharon and 
Eitan “indirectly” responsible for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres based 
upon historical information about the nature of Phalangist forces and the 
nature of the relationship between the Phalangists and the Palestinians.  
The Commission found that Sharon and Eitan were well aware of the 
combat morality of the Phalangists, that combatants in Lebanon belittled 
the value of human life, that the Phalangists harbored deep enmity for the 
Palestinians, and, most importantly for the purpose of this Article, that 
various atrocities against the noncombatant Palestinian population had 
been widespread in Lebanon since 1975.  Because of this historical 
information and common or public knowledge regarding the Phalangists’ 
combat ethics and their feelings of hatred toward the Palestinians, the 
Commission held that Sharon and Eitan should have known and foreseen, 
and should have felt apprehension that entry of the Phalangists into the 
camps held out the danger of a massacre.  However, had the I.D.F. 
exercised concrete and effective supervision and scrutiny of the Phalangist 
forces, it is possible that there would have been no place to be critical of 
them, even if ultimately it had emerged that the decision had caused 
95 Id. [emphasis added].
96 Id. at 505-506 [emphasis added].
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undesirable results and had caused damage.  Thus, the historical and 
widespread knowledge of past atrocities triggered a duty to be aware of 
possible future atrocities and to take measures to prevent them.
On the issue of command responsibility, a Trial Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated in 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (the Blaskic Case) that it considered the findings of 
the Commission in the Kahan Report “to constitute further evidence of the 
state of customary international law.”97  Further: 
With respect to the responsibility of [Eitan], the Commission held 
that his knowledge of the feelings of hatred of the particular forces 
involved towards the Palestinians did not justify the conclusion that 
the entry of those forces into the camps posed no danger.  
Accordingly, ‘The absence of a warning from experts cannot serve 
as an explanation for ignoring the danger of a massacre.  [Eitan] 
should have known and foreseen – by virtue of common knowledge, 
as well as the special information at his disposal – that there was a 
possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of 
the Phalangists.  Even if the experts did not fulfill their obligation, 
this does not absolve [Eitan] of responsibility.98
It has been interpreted that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Blaskic 
Case adopted a simple negligence, duty to know standard, whereby “the 
commander need not be in possession of ‘telling’ information.  It suffices 
that he failed to implement measures which could have yielded this kind of 
information, provided that he ‘should have known’ that the failure to 
implement these measures was a ‘criminal dereliction.”99  In the Blaskic 
Case itself, in in terpreting the Kahan Report, the Trial Chamber stated that: 
The Commission clearly held that the applicable standard for 
imputing responsibility is negligence: If [Eitan] did not imagine at 
all that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps posed a danger 
to the civilian population, his thinking on this matter constitutes a 
disregard of important considerations that he should have taken 
into account. […] We determine that [Eitan’s] inaction […] 
97
 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para 331 (ICTY, March 3, 
2000), available at www.icty.org.
98 Id. [emphasis added].
99 See Damaska, supra note 14, at n. 18; Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 863-864.
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constitute[s] a breach of duty and dereliction of the duty incumbent 
upon [him].  In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that if a 
commander has exercised due diligence in the fulfillment of his 
duties yet lacks knowledge that crimes are about to be or have been 
committed, such lack of knowledge cannot be held against him.  
However, taking into account his particular position of command 
and the circumstances prevailing at the time such ignorance cannot 
be a defence where the absence of knowledge is the result of 
negligence in the discharge of his duties:  this commander had 
reason to know within the meaning of the Statute.100
The command responsibility standard adopted by the ICTY in the 
Blaskic Case has arguably been rejected by the ICTY in a later ICTY 
Appeals Chamber decision, the Celebici Case.101  In the Celebici Case, the 
Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the “had 
reason to know” standard, which interpretation was that, “a superior will 
be criminally responsible through the principles of superior responsibility 
only if information was available to him which would have put him on 
notice of offences committed by subordinates.  This is consistent with the 
customary international law standard of mens rea as existing at the time of 
the offences charged in the Indictment.”102  Further clarifying the holding 
of the Trial Chamber in Celebici, the Appeals Chamber stated,
[T]he Trial Chamber did not hold that a superior needs to have 
information on subordinate offences in his actual possession for the 
purpose of ascribing criminal liability under the principle of 
command responsibility.  A showing that a superior had some 
general information in his possession, which would put him on 
notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates would be 
sufficient to prove that he “had reason to know.”  The ICRC 
Commentary (Additional Protocol I) refers to “reports addressed to 
(the superior), […] the tactical situation, the level of training and 
instruction of subordinate officers and their troops, and their 
character traits” as potentially constituting the information referred 
to in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I.  As to the form of the
100 See the Blaskic Case, supra note 97, para 332.
101
 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-A, paras 215-241 (ICTY, Feb. 20, 
2001), available at www.icty.org.
102 See the Celebici Case, supra note 101, para 241.
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information available to him, it may be written or oral, and does 
not need to have the form of specific reports submitted pursuant to 
a monitoring system.  This information does not need to provide 
specific information about unlawful acts committed or about to be 
committed.  For instance, a military commander who has received 
information that some of the soldiers under his command have a 
violent or unstable character, or have been drinking prior to being 
sent on a mission, may be considered as having the required 
knowledge.  Finally, the relevant information only needs to have 
been provided or available to the superior, or in the Trial 
Chamber’s words, “in the possession of.”  It is not required that he 
actually acquaint himself with the information.  In the Appeals 
Chamber’s view, an assessment of the mental element required by 
Article 7(3) of the Statute should be conducted in the specific 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the specific 
situation of the superior concerned at the time in question.  Thus, 
as correctly held by the Trial Chamber, as the element of 
knowledge has to be proved in this type of cases, command 
responsibility is not a form of strict liability.  A superior may only 
be held liable for the acts of his subordinates if it is shown that he 
“knew or had reason to know” about them.  The Appeals Chambers 
would not describe superior responsibility as a vicarious liability 
doctrine, insofar as vicarious liability may suggest a form of strict
imputed liability.103
While the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Blaskic Case cited to the 
Kahan Report in support of its adoption of a simple negligence, duty to 
know standard, arguably, the findings and analysis in the Kahan Report are 
more consistent with the ICTY’s Appeal Chamber’s interpretation in the 
Celebici Case of Article 7(3)’s “had reason to know” test.  This 
interpretation, according to some legal scholars, is the correct interpretation 
of the knowledge prerequisite under customary international law.104  In the 
Kahan Report, indirect responsibility was imposed upon Sharon and Eitan 
because they were in possession of general historical information which 
should have made them aware of future risk of violence.  Indirect 
responsibility was not imposed based upon a general duty to know.  
103 Id. at paras. 238-239 [emphasis added].
104 See Shany & Michaeli, supra note 14, at 863-864.
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As careful reading of the Kahan Report attests, the Commission did 
not find that Eitan or Sharon had a general duty to know.  Rather, the 
Commission found that both Eitan and Sharon were in possession of 
sufficient, “telling” information – historical information and information of 
common or public knowledge – which should have alerted them that 
measures needed to be taken.  Sharon and Eitan possessed information.  
What is important to this Article about the Kahan Report is the type of 
information that Sharon and Eitan possessed, upon which information the 
Commission found indirect responsibility: namely, historical information 
and common or public knowledge.  
Professor Damaska has argued that the use of the Kahan Report as 
evidence that imputed command responsibility has acquired customary 
status in international criminal law is “monument to this mistake” of 
implying that “the responsibility of commanders for the misdeeds of their 
underlings” should be vicarious.105  Damaska points out that the 
Commission never specifically invoked the doctrine of command 
responsibility and explains that:
While the Commission’s findings do stand for the proposition that 
mere negligence in preventing criminal acts of one’s subordinates 
can engage superior responsibility, the findings are completely 
silent on the issue of superior responsibility for failure to punish.  
More importantly, there is no reference whatsoever in the [Kahan 
Report] as to the specific nature of superior responsibility . . . [I]ts 
members never contemplated endorsing the concepts of primary 
responsibility of a commander for crimes committed by those 
under his control.  It was never their intention to suggest that the 
atrocities perpetrated by the Phalangists could be attributed to the 
Israeli military brass by operation of the imputed responsibility 
doctrine.106
Although the Commission might not have “contemplated endorsing 
the concepts of primary responsibility of a commander” for the atrocities 
committed by the Phalangists, in applying the doctrine of command 
responsibility under Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, the ICC can draw 
on the analysis in and findings of the Kahan Report.  In addition, the Kahan 
Report has been cited to by several international law scholars (as well as 
105 See Damaska, supra note 14, at 492-493.
106 Id. at 493.
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the ICTY, as discussed above) as an example of the application of the 
doctrine of command responsibility.107
107 See Burnett, supra note 14, passim; Malone, The Appointment of General Yaron, supra 
note 77, passim; Malone, The Kahan Report, supra note 26, passim; Shany & Michaeli, 
supra note 14, passim.
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III.  THE APPLICATION OF THE KAHAN REPORT TO ARTICLE 28(A)(I) OF 
THE ROME STATUTE, SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO GENDER CRIMES
In this Article I advance the position, as recognized in the Kahan 
Report, that knowledge about the widespread and historical occurrence of 
gender crimes in armed conflict is the type of information that should be 
deemed to satisfy the knowledge prerequisite under Rome Statute Article 
28(a)(i).  A foundational precept of my proposal is that the continuing 
commission of gender crimes in war must end, and that it is unacceptable 
to allow commanders to escape criminal responsibility for their 
subordinates’ gender crimes on the basis that the commanders lacked 
“knowledge” that subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes.  Again, gender crimes in internal and international armed conflict 
have occurred throughout history.  If it ever was, it is now no longer 
plausible or possible to justify the disregard of the danger of gender crimes 
in armed conflict.  I propose that the historical record of the continuing 
occurrence of gender crimes in armed conflict, in violation of international 
humanitarian law, be paired with the doctrine of command responsibility in 
an attempt to stop gender crimes.  As the Kahan Report stated and as I 
discussed earlier, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that commanders 
ignore the danger of gender crimes – despite the widespread and 
continuing commission of such crimes – perhaps out of an awareness that 
there are advantages to such excesses.
The standard I propose is not a strict liability standard.  A 
commander can be relieved of criminal liability if, as referenced in the 
Kahan Report, he or she took all possible steps to prevent sexual violence 
against women.  What this standard does is to make it easier for 
commanders to be held individually criminally responsible for the 
commission of gender crimes by his or her subordinates.  I am hoping that 
commanders, assuming that a commander/subordinate relationship exists, 
will recognize that the only remaining barrier between them and 
prosecution before the ICC is a persuasive demonstration that they took all 
necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or punish 
the commission of gender crimes and will have a heightened incentive to 
take such measures.  Adding to this incentive should be the knowledge that 
any analysis by ICC judges of whether or not a commander took “all 
necessary and reasonable measures” will be retrospective and likely 
undertaken by lawyers who may have no military experience.  I hope that 
this combination of incentives – satisfaction of the knowledge prerequisite 
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with historical and common or public knowledge and the awareness of a 
retrospective analysis by non-military personal – will serve to better protect 
women from sexual violence during war.  
Admittedly, an argument can be made that, because atrocities, in 
general, have historically been committed during war and are a matter of 
common or public knowledge, such knowledge cannot be deemed to 
satisfy the knowledge prerequisite of Article 28(a)(i) as that prerequisite 
would always and necessarily be met, rendering the prerequisite a nullity.  
However, I limit the application of my proposal of using historical 
information and common or public knowledge to satisfy the knowledge 
prerequisite of Article 28(a)(i) to gender crimes because, unlike other 
“atrocities”, gender crimes are always violations of international 
humanitarian law and can never be justified by military necessity.    
As explained above, using historical information and common or 
public knowledge to satisfy the knowledge prerequisite makes the 
prosecution of commanders easier because only two prerequisites – status 
and failure to act – remain to be satisfied.  The tension between military 
necessity and humanity are always at play during war.108  With respect to 
atrocities in general committed during war, in the fog of war, given the 
needs of military operations, it might be difficult to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible behavior under international humanitarian 
law.  For example, with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war, the 
application of a standard which would make it easier to convict a 
commander for all atrocities committed by subordinates might serve to 
undermine principles of military necessity.109  However, rape and other 
forms of sexual violence against women during war clearly violate 
international humanitarian law, and no acceptable argument can be made 
that such conduct is militarily necessary.  A standard making it easier for 
commanders to be held criminally responsible for gender crimes 
committed by their subordinates does not or at least should not serve to 
undermine military necessity.    
As explained above in Part I, leading commentators on the doctrine 
of command responsibility debate whether Article 28(a)(i) adopts a simple 
negligence/“should have known” or the stricter/“some information” 
108 See Burnett, supra note 14, at 76-77; Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 2; Smidt, supra note 
15, at 156-159.
109 See Smidt, supra note 15, at 158-159.
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standard.110  My proposal should work, regardless of which standard the 
ICC chooses to adopt.  Under my proposal, the issue is not whether the 
commander had “telling” information, but rather the type of information 
that the commander had.  Under my proposal, the commander is assumed 
to have ample information about the historical and widespread occurrence 
of gender crimes in armed conflict – enough information to impel him or 
her to act or to seek more information.  Thus, my proposal should be able 
to meet either of the competing knowledge standards of liability.  
110 See Lippman, supra note 14, at 86 (The language in Article 28 of the Rome Statute “is 
directly drawn from the Geneva Protocol.”); Smidt, supra note 15, at 211 (“Other than the 
fact that the drafters of the ICC Statute clearly intended to establish the Yamashita ‘knew 
or should have known’ standard of command responsibility . . ..”); Vetter, supra note 14, 
at 122 (“The ‘owing to the circumstances at the time’ clause immediately preceding the 
phrase ‘should have known’ in Article 28 of the Rome Statute, makes a substantial 
difference and probably makes the ICC standard closer to the ICTY standard than to the 
mythical ‘should have known’ standard.”).
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CONCLUSION
Rape and other types of gender crimes have historically been 
committed against women during war.  Given the AIDS pandemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the correlation between the widespread transmission of 
the HIV virus and rape by soldiers during armed conflict, the international 
community needs to seriously address finding ways to prevent or deter the 
commission of rape and other gender crimes during armed conflict.  A 
purpose of the international humanitarian and military law doctrine of 
command responsibility is to deter the commission of war crimes.  The 
three prerequisites to liability under the doctrine are: 1) a 
commander/subordinate relationship; 2) “knowledge” that subordinates are 
committing or about to commit the crimes; and, 3) the failure to prevent or 
punish the crimes.  A possible avenue to the prevention of gender crimes 
during armed conflict is through the application by the ICC of the doctrine 
of command responsibility to gender crimes, because the specter of 
prosecution before the ICC will lead to better preventative measures.  
Specifically, I propose that, for gender crimes, the prerequisite of 
knowledge for imposition of liability under Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i) 
would be satisfied by historical information and common or public 
knowledge that gender crimes have occurred throughout history within 
internal and international armed conflicts.  As the above discussion makes 
clear, the Kahan Report provides precedent for using historical information 
and common or public knowledge in order to satisfy the knowledge 
prerequisite of command responsibility.  My proposal should increase the 
likelihood of prosecution and conviction for gender crimes committed 
during armed conflict, which likelihood should in turn increase the 
incentive to prevent their commission.111
111 There are additional issues related to command responsibility that I hope to address in 
future articles.  For example, one issue which deserves exploration is the definition of a 
“person effectively acting as a military commander” under Rome Statute Article 28(a), as 
well as the definition of the non-military superior/subordinate relationship under Article 
28(b).  Given situations like that in Rwanda, where a year before the genocide, the 
government armed forces intentionally “privatized” the violence against the Tutsi and 
“delegated” the violence to civilians specifically in order to avoid criminal responsibility 
(see Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of 
the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and 
Territories, Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum, Report by Mr. 
B.W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, 
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E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 at ¶ (11 August 1993) [hereinafter, the “UN Report”]), an important 
issue to explore is whether the Rwandan Hutu government armed forces effectively 
avoided criminal responsibility before the ICTR.  An examination of the jurisprudence of 
the ICTR might suggest that the ICTR has been unable to impose criminal responsibility 
on either military commanders or civilian superiors for the conduct of the civilian armed 
bands that largely committed the genocide, because the ICTR might be finding it difficult 
to establish the existence of a superior/subordinate relationship between the civilian or 
military leaders and the civilian “subordinates” who committed the genocide.  
Consequently, in part, because of the conscious “privatization” of violence by formal 
armed forces, the ICTR might only be able to impose criminal responsibility on those 
individuals whom the ICTR can prove were somehow personally involved, which would 
not set good precedent.  
Another possible issue, given the recent federal litigation in Florida involving 
command responsibility under the Alien Torts Claim Act and Torture Victims Protection 
Act (see Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th  Cir. 2002); Romagoza v. Garcia, Case No. 
99-8364 CIV-HURLEY, verdict available at
http://www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza_Docs/RomagozaVerdict.htm) is the effective use of
the United States federal judicial system in holding non-national commanders civilly 
responsible for gender crimes committed in armed conflict.
